The money can sometimes be stopped in the first twenty-four hours, and it can almost never be recovered after the trail goes cold. So the sequence after an OTP fraud is not about evidence first — it is about freezing the destination account, then preserving the evidence of the fraud. The complaint on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal is what triggers the process, and the bank's transaction record is what supports the bank's liability.
The first hour
- Call the bank's helpline and ask for the card or the account to be frozen for debits. Note the time of the call and the reference number.
- File a complaint immediately on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal, which generates a reference number and routes the complaint to the police. The portal has a category for financial cyber fraud.
- Call the national cybercrime helpline number published by the government and quote the portal reference.
- Send a written report to the bank by email, with the transaction details, so that the bank's report requirement under the limited liability framework is satisfied in writing.
- Inform the beneficiary bank through the bank, which can place a lien on the destination account where the money is still there.
Do not wait to gather all the documents before filing. The portal complaint can be filed on the basic facts and supplemented later. The freeze is the priority, and it runs on the portal reference.
The evidence the police and the bank will want
Assemble a single file with the following, and keep a copy:
- The bank statement for the account for the period covering the transaction, downloaded from net banking as a PDF, not a screenshot.
- The transaction alert messages, with the sender identity and the timestamps visible.
- The call detail record for the phone for the day, which shows the incoming number of the caller who posed as the bank official.
- Recordings of the call, where available; many phones record calls, and some do not. Where a recording does not exist, the call detail record is the substitute.
- Screenshots of any message, email or link the fraudster sent, with the sender's address and the full URL visible.
- The complaint numbers from the portal, the helpline and the bank, in one place.
The single most useful document is the bank statement showing the debit, because it identifies the destination account and the amount. Everything else supports the characterisation of the debit as unauthorised.
How the fraud usually happens
The patterns repeat. A caller claims to be from the bank or the card network and says a fraudulent transaction is being reversed, and asks for the OTP to "complete the reversal". A message says the account will be blocked unless a form is completed at a link. A caller claims to be from a delivery company asking for a small payment for a parcel. A message offers a refund of a tax or an electricity bill. In each, the object is to obtain the OTP, the card details and the PIN, or to have the victim install a screen-sharing application.
The screen-sharing fraud is the most damaging because, once installed, the application lets the fraudster see the OTP and every credential. A victim who has installed such an application should remove it, change every password from a different device, and inform the bank that the device was compromised.
The law treats cheating by personation using a computer resource and identity theft as specific offences, and the fraudulent use of another person's electronic signature, password or unique identification feature is a distinct offence under the Information Technology Act. These carry punishments and are tried along with the general offence of cheating.
The bank's liability
The Reserve Bank's limited liability framework applies. Where the fraud is a phishing attack caused by a security breach at the bank's end, and the customer reports within three working days of the alert, the customer's liability is ordinarily nil. Where the customer shared the credential through the fraudster's deception, the bank will argue contributory negligence, and whether that argument succeeds depends on the facts and on the bank's own security arrangements.
The argument that a customer was deceived into sharing an OTP is not the same as the customer being careless. The distinction is often decisive, and it is made on the material: was there a call from a number resembling the bank's, was the message crafted to look like the bank's own, did the bank's alert itself come late.
A bank that failed to send an alert, or sent it after the transaction, has difficulty arguing that the customer should have acted faster.
Freeze, then file, then document. The freeze is the only step that can actually recover the money.
Recovering the money
Where the destination account is frozen with the money still in it, the bank can reverse it, and this is the best outcome. Where the money has moved on to a second or third account, the police trace it through the banking system, and the success of the tracing depends on speed. Where it has been withdrawn in cash, recovery against the fraudster is usually theoretical, and the customer's remedy shifts to the bank on the liability framework.
The civil remedies run alongside the criminal investigation. A complaint before the banking ombudsman lies against the bank for its failure to comply with the framework, and a consumer complaint lies where the failure amounts to a deficiency in service. Both are separate from the police case, and neither depends on the fraudster being caught.
Common questions
Is there a time limit for reporting to the bank?
The framework fixes three working days from the alert for a zero-liability finding in a bank-negligence case, and a longer window for limited liability. Complaint against the bank for a deficiency has its own limitation. Report at once, whatever the framework says.
Does the bank need the police complaint to process the reversal?
In a zero-liability case the framework does not require it, though the bank will commonly ask. File the complaint on the portal, quote the reference to the bank, and do not accept a refusal that is based solely on the absence of a police paper.
What if the fraudster called from a number that looks like the bank's?
Record it. The call detail record, the number and the timing are evidence, and a number that closely resembles the bank's official number is itself part of the deception, which affects the assessment of the customer's negligence.
Freeze the account, file on the portal, and keep a single evidential file. Our cyber fraud practice handles the police and bank sides in Kolkata, banking and finance covers the bank complaint, and consumer protection covers the deficiency claim.